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Russia’s Ostrich Approach to Climate Change 
and the Paris Agreement  
Alexey Kokorin and Anna Korppoo 
Summary 
 Despite the latest information from Russia’s leading climate scientists, the country’s political 
leadership does not acknowledge the importance of anthropogenic factors in climate change. 
This is in stark contrast to most other governments, which recognise that there is no longer any 
doubt about the human origins of climate change.  
 Russia’s leadership has nevertheless acknowledged the negative nature of changes in the 
climate and noted the growing risks to Russian territory. It also emphasises the need for 
adaptation, in contrast to its previous tendency to dismiss such risks.  
 In the view of Russia’s leadership, the global economic trend recognised by the Paris Agreement 
will generate risks for the national economy, but only in the distant future. This interpretation 
leads to a delay in adopting robust measures for low-carbon development, and explains the 
focus on short-term energy efficiency measures. Russia’s GHG emissions target mainly reflects 
a business-as-usual approach to the development of energy efficiency. 
 The leadership relies on Russian prognoses that the global fossil-fuel era will continue for the 
foreseeable future, and ignores recent signals that would advocate phasing out coal and oil. 
Carbon regulation is already included as a policy tool to introduce new technologies, but is to 
be launched on an economy-wide scale only in the late 2020-30s. Russia’s main trading partners 
(China, Germany, Japan, Korea, India, and the Nordic countries) should communicate to 
Moscow, for example in bilateral meetings, BRICS, SCO and others, that climate change policies 
and regulations are being adopted by most countries, not least out of benign self-interest. In 
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Introduction 
Following the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, it is timely to look at trends in Russia, 
the world’s fifth-largest GHG emitter. The Kremlin has altered its climate policy since 2013;1 it 
now recognises the threats to Russian territory posed 
by climate change and emphasises the need for 
adaptation. Yet Russia’s climate mitigation lags far 
behind the pace of global efforts, due to the 
leadership’s ‘ostrich approach’ to phasing out fossil 
fuels, and its denial of the anthropogenic origins of 
climate change.  
This paper examines these dynamics and discusses possible ways of encouraging Moscow to 
launch a more effective climate policy, with more ambitious emission targets, while at the same 
time protecting its fossil fuel based economy. 
Little confidence in climate science 
A coalition of Russian climate science and environmental organisations has begun to raise 
awareness among the Russian public and stakeholders about the policy process of building 
scientific consensus on the origins of climate change. In 2015, several key research institutes 
jointly issued the Second Russian Assessment Report on climate change,2 which resembles 
volumes 1 and 2 of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report. As one of its key messages it underlines 
the predominance of anthropogenic causes of climate change during the 20th and 21st centuries 
– a fact still denied by many in Russia. 
This coalition has generated a significant stream of information on the anthropogenic origins 
of climate change. Every two months, the Russian Hydrometeorological Service (Roshydromet) 
publishes the bulletin Climate Change. Following the initiative of the Presidential Climate 
Envoy, Alexander Bedritsky, the first All-Russian Climate Week was held from 15 May to 15 June 
                                                 
1 A. Kokorin & A. Korppoo, 2013. “Russia’s post-Kyoto climate policy: Real action or merely window-dressing?” (FNI 
Climate Policy Perspectives 10, May). Lysaker, Norway: Fridtjof Nansen Institute (https://www.fni.no/publications/ 
russia-s-post-kyoto-climate-policy-real-action-or-merely-window-dressing-article906-290.html). 
2 Second Assessment Report of Roshydromet on climate changes and its consequences on the territory of the Russian 
Federation. Moscow. Roshydromet. 2015. 1008 pp. (in Russian, with General Summary in English) 
(http://downloads.igce.ru/publications/OD_2_2014/v2014/htm/). 
Russia’s climate mitigation lags significantly 
behind the pace of global efforts, due to the 
leadership’s ‘ostrich approach’ to phasing 
out fossil fuels, and its denial of the 
anthropogenic origins of climate change. 
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2017.3 It featured some 400 events publicising climate science, in particular, the anthropogenic 
origins of climate change, including a keynote lecture for policy-process stakeholders delivered 
at the Analytical Centre for the Government by Vladimir Kattsov, Director of the Main 
Geophysical Observatory and active IPCC author.4 Nevertheless, a July 2017 opinion poll 
indicated that 70% of the Russian public associated severe weather alterations with climate 
change, but only 55% acknowledged the anthropogenic origins of climate change (35% 
attributed changes to natural variations).5 The origins of climate change are widely considered 
to be a combination of natural and anthropogenic causes; 39% of those surveyed still 
considered the topic of climate change to be far-fetched and speculative. During the Q&A 
session at the International Economic Forum in St Petersburg in June 2017, President Putin 
himself explained the background to this:  
It’s [the Paris Agreement] about preventing temperature changes of two degrees, but we 
don't feel here [in Russia] that the temperature is getting hotter.”6 
At the Arctic Territory for Dialogue Forum in Arkhangelsk in March 2017, President Putin openly 
expressed doubts about the anthropogenic nature of climate change, emphasising adaptation 
instead: 
I agree with those who believe that prevention [of climate change] is not the point, because 
it is impossible, as it may be related to some global cycles on the Earth or be of the 
planetary scale. The point is how to adapt.7 
This can be considered as a deviation from Putin’s previous approach: he had acknowledged 
the anthropogenic origin of climate change by signing the 2009 Climate Doctrine, a document 
that is clear on that point. More recent documents have confirmed the scientific doubts of the 
Russian leadership, however, and hence its backtracking on the issue. In the first national 
“Environmental Security Strategy” adopted in April 2017,8  climate change tops the list of global 
challenges – but only adaptation is mentioned, while the anthropogenic origins of climate 
change go unrecognised. In 2017, the Implementation Plan of the Climate Doctrine was 
amended, mainly to focus on adaptation.9 Further, the 2016 Russian Climate Action Plan10 
                                                 
3 See http://en.kremlin.ru/events/administration/54498 
4 Analytical Centre for the Government of the Russian Federation. 24 May 2017. Workshop: Status of science 
knowledge on climate change: World and Russia – influence on activities (http://ac.gov.ru/events/012993.html). 
5 WCIOM, Press-release # 3425, 24 July 2017 (https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=116325). 
6 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4566764/Putin-thanks-Trump-withdrawing-Paris-Accord.html  
7 V.V. Putin. Speech at the International Forum ‘The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue’, Arkhangelsk, 30 March 2017 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54149). 
8 Environmental Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2025, 19 April 2017 
(http://pravo.gov.ru/laws/acts/32/495554.html). 
9 On amendments to the implementation plan of the Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation by 2020. 
Resolution # 162-p of the Russian Government (31 January 2017). 
10 Implementation plan for a set of measures to improve national regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and to 
prepare for the ratification of the Paris Agreement. Resolution #2344-p of the Russian Government (3 November 
2016). 
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delayed Russian ratification of the Paris Agreement, while specifying a very tight schedule for 
adaptation; a national adaptation plan is set to be drafted by mid-2018. 
The leadership’s recognition of climate-related risks on 
Russian territory is a positive sign in terms of the safety 
of the population, but it is associated mainly with 
dangerous trends in weather patterns. The science on 
long-term trends in ‘abnormal’ weather events is 
recognised by Russian society and the leadership – but 
remains detached from the effect of GHG emissions. Therefore, the awareness-raising efforts 
of the climate coalition need to focus on the origins of climate change. On the other hand, the 
domestic coalition is obviously lacking in influence among domestic stakeholders. For this 
reason the influence of other governments – Russia’s leading partners such as Germany, 
France, Italy, Japan, China, India and the Nordic countries – is crucial to convincing Russia that 
there is no longer any scientific doubt about the central role of GHG emissions in causing 
climate change. 
The Trump effect 
Regardless of the country’s weak mitigation track record and lack of ratification so far, Russia’s 
leadership sees itself as following the Paris Agreement. In the words of President Putin, 
We are scrupulous about environmental and climate problems... we are improving the 
national regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and are keen to ensure rapid and cost-
effective reduction in emissions in compliance with the Paris Agreement.11  
Reacting to the decision of US President Donald Trump to withdraw the United States from the 
Paris Agreement, the Russian President’s spokesman stated unequivocally: “today there is no 
alternative [to this agreement].”12 As pragmatically put by Sergey Donskoy, the Russian 
Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology, during the St. Petersburg economic forum, the 
impacts on trade are what matter the most: 
Withdrawal of even a very large emitter, such as the U.S., does not mean termination of 
the Paris Agreement; for the Russian Federation, the ratification of the Agreement by trade 
partners other than the United States remains an important factor. We also [like them] are 
planning to implement climate policies domestically.13 
Even though Russia appears unlikely to follow the US example regarding the Paris Agreement, 
Putin seems to understand Trump’s worries. He has even indicated the possibility of adjusting 
                                                 
11 V.V. Putin. Speech at the 23rd World Energy Congress. Istanbul, 10 October 2016 
(http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53062). 
12 “The Kremlin Declares Commitment to the Paris Climate Accord” (http://www.interfax.ru/russia/564790). 
13 “Donald Trump Decides to Cancel Ratification of the Paris Agreement,” 2 June 2017 
(http://kommersant.ru/doc/3314236). 
The leadership’s recognition of climate-
related risks on Russian territory is a positive 
sign for the safety of the population, but the 
risks are mainly linked to clearly dangerous 
trends in weather patterns. 
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the deal, as “we still have time.”14 As stated above, in 2009 the Kremlin had officially adopted 
the view that climate change was of anthropogenic origin. That the administration is now 
resuming its sceptical views on climate science seems to correlate with the arrival of Trump, 
known to be highly sceptical of climate science. For instance, in 2012 he tweeted: 
The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. 
manufacturing non-competitive.15 
Since entering the White House, he has withdrawn the USA from the Paris Agreement, and 
references to climate change have been deleted from the US Environmental Protection 
Agency’s website.16 Such a figure is likely to downgrade the importance of climate in the minds 
running the Kremlin; under these circumstances, Russia is unlikely to be considered as the worst 
global climate rogue. This provides fertile ground for Moscow to revert to its previous view, in 
line with the Russian public’s scepticism about climate science. 
The Paris Agreement in Russia: energy efficiency and economic concerns 
Russia’s leadership sees the Paris Agreement as part of the global economic low-carbon trend, 
which entails risks to a national economy based on the export of oil, gas, metals and mineral 
resources. Russia consumes much more energy per unit of GDP than the world’s leading 
economies. This fact has long been a source of concern for the government, which in 2009 
adopted the target of reducing the energy intensity of the economy by 40% (in relation to the 
2007 level) by 2020. This target will not be achieved, however. The current energy intensity of 
the economy remains 6% below the 2007 level, declining by 5.4% between 2008 and 2014.17 
Indeed, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), little change is expected until 2020 
(Fig. 1). 
                                                 
14 Daily Mail, 2 June 2017. “Vlad the Entertainer: Putin jokes that Russians are grateful Trump left Paris Accord, 
saying surprise storm that hit Moscow can now be blamed on US president and 'American imperialism'” 
(http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4566764/Putin-thanks-Trump-withdrawing-Paris-Accord.html).  
15 R. Harrington, “President-elect Donald Trump doesn't believe in climate change. Here's his platform on the 
environment”, Business Insider, 9 November 2016 (http://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-climate-
change-global-warming-environment-policies-plans-platforms-2016-10?r=US&IR=T&IR=T).  
16 L. Smith, “Trump administration deletes the mention of ‘climate change’ from Environmental Protection 
Agency’s website”, The Independent, 21 October 2017 (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-
politics/donald-trump-administration-climate-change-deleted-environmental-protection-agency-website-
a8012581.html).  
17 Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation by 2035. Ministry of Energy. Draft agreed by all ministries (version of 
01.02.2017) (http://minenergo.gov.ru/node/1920). 
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Figure 1. IEA ‘new policies’ scenario: projected energy intensities until 2040  
toe/US$ 1000 GDP ($2015 market exchange rate) 
 
Source: data from World Energy Outlook 2016. International Energy Agency, Paris, 
(http://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2016/november/world-energy-outlook-2016.html). 
The IEA’s projection coincides largely with the Russian Energy Strategy’s 2035 target of 
reducing energy intensity by one third of the 2015 level. This is discouraging: even if the current 
Energy Strategy goals are reached, Russia would remain a global outsider in terms of the energy 
intensity of the economy. Energy efficiency per se is not important for Russia, as its energy 
resources are abundant and prices are low, as recently highlighted by the Ministry of Economic 
Development at the Analytical Centre for the Government of the Russian Federation.18 Without 
subsidies, the wholesale market price for electricity ranges from €¢1.3-2.5 /kWh and pump 
petrol €¢50-60 / litre. In 2005-10, energy efficiency was driven by the priority given to saving 
natural gas for export. Today, however, this is not the case: export is limited by the prices and 
policies of the importing countries. Although the situation in the global gas market has changed, 
the need to bridge the technological gap and to improve labour productivity has emerged as a 
strong driver. 
The Ministry of Economic Development has explicitly expressed concerns about the national 
economy: the high energy intensity involved in production can reduce the competitiveness of 
Russian exports and should therefore be improved.19 According to the ministry, new 
technologies and higher labour productivity can help attract investment; in their absence it 
would be difficult to generate more than 1.5% GDP growth per year.20 The ministry also 
declared a third driver – low carbon development – and calculated its possible effects. 
                                                 
18 Dmitry Vakhrukov (Deputy Director of Department of the Ministry of Economic Development). Analytical Centre 
for the Government of the Russian Federation. Round Table on Comprehensive Plan to Improve Energy Efficiency 
of the Economy of the Russian Federation, 10 August 2017 (http://ac.gov.ru/events/013922.html). 
19 Dmitry Vakhrukov (Deputy Director of Department of the Ministry of Economic Development). Analytical Centre 
for the Government of the Russian Federation. Round Table on Comprehensive Plan to Improve Energy Efficiency 
of the Economy of the Russian Federation, 10 August 2017 (http://ac.gov.ru/events/013922.html). 
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At the end of 2016, the Ministry of Economic Development presented to the Office of the Prime 
Minister two scenarios developed jointly with the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Ecology, labelled “conservative” and “energy-efficient” (Fig. 2).21 The first 
scenario builds on the “basic+” scenario of the draft “Projection of long-term social and 
economic development of Russia to 2035” authored by the Ministry of Economy. The second 
scenario includes the transition launched by the “Russian Energy Strategy until 2035” 
developed by the Ministry of Energy.  
The first scenario predicts a 25% growth in primary energy consumption between 2017 and 
2050, while the second expects stability of demand over the next few decades. The 
conservative scenario envisages that the energy intensity of the economy will reach 64% of the 
2007 level, and the energy-efficient scenario 49%, by 2050. Both scenarios expect a very low 
share of renewable energy in 2050 – only about 5% of total energy consumption. The main 
difference between the scenarios is that in the conservative case, 80% of capital investments 
are allocated to energy resources extraction and transportation, while in the energy-efficient 
scenario the allocation is somewhat lower, at 65-70%. Capital investments in energy efficiency 
are forecast at 20% and 30-35%, respectively. 
Figure 2. Russia’s energy-related GHG emissions to 2050, ‘conservative’ and ‘energy efficient’ 
scenarios (% of 1990 level) 
 
1- Historical data and conservative scenario 
2- Energy efficient scenario 
According to the 2017 data, energy-related emissions in 1990 were 3,077 MtСО2-eq.22 According to the 2016 data, which 
were used by the Ministry of economic development in the two scenarios, it was higher – 3,250 MtСО2-eq. Such minor 
discrepancies have no impact on the findings of this analysis. 
Source: 1 and 2 are based on data of the Ministry of Economic Development. 
                                                 
21 On development of scenario prognosis of GHG emissions by 2020 and perspective by 2030. Report of the RF 
Ministry of Economic Development to the RF Government (Office of the Prime Minister), 28 November 2016. 
22 UNFCCC. National Inventory Submissions 2017, Russian Federation, Common Reporting Format, 25 July 2017 
(http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/ 
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Economic risks related to global mitigation measures are underlined in the Economic Security 
Strategy to 2030 (May 2017). The list of challenges and risks includes “the intention of 
developed economies to use their advantages in … cutting-edge technologies as an instrument 
in global competition”, and “changes in the global energy demand, development of energy 
efficiency technologies, and development of ‘green’ technologies”. This recognition of both the 
economic risks and the major impact of the global low-carbon trend shows that developments 
in international climate policy are followed closely in the Russian administration. However, 
domestic mitigation policies and measures are limited to energy efficiency23 – cutting GHG 
emissions is not a goal per se, given the perceived scientific uncertainties surrounding the 
anthropogenic origins of climate change. In fact, there is a bigger problem with domestic policy: 
its remarkable delay. 
Dramatic delay, weakened GHG targets 
Russia’s leadership only sees the economy’s over-
dependence on the export of fossil fuels in terms of a 
future, not an imminent threat, and the public is firmly 
convinced that it will take a long time for the global 
economy to switch from hydrocarbons. This belief is 
reflected in the global and Russian energy-sector 
projections of the “Energy Strategy by 2035”24 and 
joint projections of the Analytical Centre for the Government and Energy Research Institute of 
the Russian Academy of Science. They forecast that the global energy sector will remain fossil-
fuel-based until the 2040s;25 in the scenario deemed most likely, global CO2 emissions will 
increase by 16% for the period 2013-40, while the scenario with the lowest CO2 growth foresees 
stabilisation in 2025, but with no reduction expected until 2040. The first is consistent with the 
IEA’s global “New Policy Scenario”. Yet lower projection is crucially different from the most 
recent low carbon IEA projection, the “Sustainable Development Scenario” with reduction by 
about 40% by 2040.26 The deviation is most stark in projections of Russia’s renewable energy, 
other than large hydro. The IEA scenarios envisage an 8% and a 21% share of national electricity 
generation, respectively, while the Russian “Energy Strategy until 2035” forecasts only a 2-4% 
share. The “Energy Strategy until 2035” fails to prepare the country for the post-oil era, partly 
because it ignores global low-carbon options. It predicted that the oil price would reach 80-100 
                                                 
23 For instance, the mitigation section of the Climate Doctrine Implementation Plan was amended in 2017 only 
with regard to energy-efficiency activities. On amendments to the implementation plan of the Climate Doctrine of 
the Russian Federation by 2020. Resolution # 162-p of the Russian Government (31.01.2017). 
24 Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2035. Ministry of Energy. Draft agreed by all ministries (final 
version of 01.02.2017) (http://minenergo.gov.ru/node/1920). 
25 A.A. Makarov, L.M. Grigoriev, T.A. Mitrova (eds), Global and Russian energy sector development projection 2016. 
Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Science, Analytical Centre for the RF Government. 2016 
(http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/10585.pdf). 
26 World Energy Outlook 2016. International Energy Agency, Paris, November 2017. 
Russia’s leadership only sees the economy’s 
over-dependence on the export of fossil 
fuels in terms of a future, not an imminent 
threat, and the public is firmly convinced 
that it will take a long time for the global 
economy to switch from hydrocarbons. 
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USD2014/barrel and fossil-fuel-based electricity generation would remain at the current level 
of about 65% also in 2035. Russian СО2 emissions remain stable, at roughly 70% of the 1990 
level. Following this logic, Russia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) under 
the Paris Agreement was announced as not to exceed 70–75% of the 1990 level with the 
maximum possible account of absorbing capacity of forests.27  
This reference to forests (land use, land-use change and the forestry sector: LULUCF) requires 
explanation. In 1990, LULUCF was a net CO2 source, rather than the large net sink it has become 
today.28 The main reason lies in the dynamics of the age-class composition of Russia’s forests. 
Massive clear-cutting in the former USSR produced emissions from the 1960s to the 1980s, 
whereas subsequent reforestation generated young, fast-growing forests with large CO2 
absorption. However, today’s forests are ageing, with a corresponding decline in absorptive 
capacity. According to forestry science,29 as well as the most recent Russian Biennial Report to 
the UNFCCC,30 the current net sink will drop to zero over the next 40 years. This decline can be 
halted only by radical changes in forestry practices and by protecting significant amounts of 
primary forests from commercial clear-cutting. The scenarios prepared by the Ministry of 
Economic Development (conservative and energy efficiency) combined with the LULUCF (Fig. 
3) indicate that to comply with its INDC, Russia will either have to deviate substantially from 
the conservative scenario, or include LULUCF. Representatives of carbon-intensive industries 
have been insisting on the latter option. 
Reliance on scenarios that forecast a very slow decarbonisation of the global economy crucially 
influences all mitigation measures in Russia. In particular, further development of the 
renewable energy (RE) sector is only envisaged for the future. The current primary goal of the 
sector is to launch the domestic manufacturing of cutting-edge RE equipment. Therefore, a 
main eligibility criterion for governmental support through the tending system of renewable 
energy (wind, solar and small hydro) is the level of ‘localisation’: the share of equipment 
produced or assembled in Russia in the total cost of equipment. Using the most cost-effective 
or best available RE technology would make a greater contribution to the share of renewable 
energy, however. For 2018-21, the government will support 2 GW in capacity of wind and solar; 
support to further 4 GW is foreseen by 2024. In 2016, Russian solar and wind capacity was a 
mere 700 MW, out of line with global trends. Government support is expected to bring the 
total of RE sources (including some 47 GW of old large hydro) up to some 4.9% of total end-use 
                                                 
27 UNFCCC INDCs as communicated by Parties (Russia has not yet ratified the treaty, hence not an NDC) 
(http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx). 
28 UNFCCC. National Inventory Submissions 2017, Russian Federation, Common Reporting Format, 25 July 2017 
(http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/ 
10116.php).  
29 For details see A. Kokorin, “Russia’s Post-Paris Climate Policy: Slow Progress and Problems”, Russian Analytical 
Digest, 2016 №185, pp. 9–14 (http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-
securities-studies/pdfs/RAD185.pdf). 
30 UNFCCC. Second Biennial Report of the Russian Federation. 30 December 2015 (http://unfccc.int/files/ 
national_reports/biennial_reports_and_iar/submitted_biennial_reports/application/pdf/2br_rus.pdf). 
RUSSIA’S OSTRICH APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PARIS AGREEMENT | 9 
 
demand by 2030, as against 3.6% in 2010. This represents an important step forward, but is 
very modest in comparison with the rest of the world.31 
Notwithstanding, Russia’s leadership is apparently sticking to its ostrich approach to global 
developments in renewable energy, ignoring the falling costs of electricity generated by RE. The 
best plants are currently generating some €¢2.1-2.6 /kWh,32 which is close to the average costs 
of electricity generation in some parts of Russia. All the same, in June 2017, Vice Prime Minister 
Arkady Dvorkovich advised waiting until RE could become cost-effective in Russia as a whole.33 
Building such a delay into the Russian Energy Strategy seems very odd, in view of the favourable 
market conditions today. 
Figure 3. Russian GHG emissions, all sources, to 2050 in the ‘conservative’ and ‘energy 
efficiency’ scenarios, MtСО2-eq. per year 
 
1- Conservative scenario (excl. LULUCF) 
2- Conservative scenario (incl. LULUCF) 
3- Energy efficiency scenario (excl. LULUCF) 
4- Energy efficiency scenario (incl. LULUCF) 
According to the 2017 data, Russia’s 1990 emissions were 3,768 MtСО2-eq. (excl. LULUCF), or 3,929 MtСО2-eq. 
(incl. LULUCF). According to the 2016 data, which were used by the Ministry of Economic Development in 
calculations under the two scenarios, the levels were higher: 3,940 and 4,105 MtСО2-eq. respectively. Therefore, 
minor deviations in percentage magnitudes are possible: however, with no impact on the findings of this analysis. 
Sources: 1 and 3 are based on data of the Ministry of Economic Development; 2 and 4 are the authors’ estimates 
based on Russia’s Biennial Report to the UNFCCC 
                                                 
31 IRENA, 2017. “Remap 2030 Renewable Energy Prospects for Russian Federation”, working paper, IRENA, Abu 
Dhabi (www.irena.org/remap). 
32 New Energy Outlook 2017. Bloomberg New Energy Finance (https://about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/). 
33 “Dvorkovich called for no hurry with renewable energy sources”, St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, 
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There may also be a delay in adopting a low-carbon strategy and carbon regulation. According 
to the Russian Action Plan,34 a “low-carbon strategy until 2050” is to be drafted by the end of 
2019. Whether this can be achieved, however, is open to question, as the Federal Law on 
Strategic planning requires it to be based on a social and economic development projection 
and strategy for the same period – and such documents are being developed only for the period 
until 2035. A draft of a new Federal Law on Carbon Regulation is also expected in 2019, but 
there is no progress plan for its adoption, as is required to pass a law. Moreover, a draft may 
contain only principles and approaches, without concrete mitigation measures and GHG 
targets, which provides a weak basis for progress. Any 
practical measures are opposed by coal and other 
businesses currently relying on carbon-intensive 
technologies, and are therefore postponed – to the 
distant future. The Ministry of Economic Development’s 
2017 three-stage plan provides an example.35 For 2017–20 it primarily foresees the analysis 
and design of possible policy measures. Only after that will there be a move towards 
incentivising and implementing energy-efficiency improvements. The introduction of economy-
wide carbon regulation, deliberately kept undefined for now, is not scheduled until after 2030. 
Such delays in climate policies run counter to the 
global trends that already impact Russia. The 
expansion of coal exports to the Asian market, 
previously anticipated by Russian stakeholders, is now 
in serious doubt since China, Vietnam and other 
countries in the region have opted to prioritise 
alternative energy paths. Korea and Japan are not 
viewed as long-term buyers either, due to their plans for alternative energy. The extraction of 
Arctic offshore energy resources, long considered vital for the country’s economic future, has 
met obstacles. The development of the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea was cancelled 
because of cost issues, combined with falling prices in the global markets triggered by the 
emergence of shale gas. Later, falling oil prices placed a question mark over the profitability of 
other Arctic offshore projects. In the short term they have been delayed because of Western 
sanctions against Russia. Only one offshore project is in operation – the Prirazlomnoe field in 
the Pechora Sea. Also, Russian gas exports’ ‘turn to the East’, announced in 2014, is facing 
challenges. China’s need for Russian gas is being adjusted downward. It shows little interest for 
the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline, and may even seek a revision of the contract on Power of 
Siberia-1.  Nevertheless, there will still be a large market for Russian oil and gas, including in 
Europe. But price pressure means that more expensive Russian sources will become less 
attractive so that keeping production and export on the very high level it is now may become 
                                                 
34 Implementation plan for a set of measures to improve national regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and to 
prepare for the ratification of the Paris Agreement. Resolution #2344-p of the Russian Government (03.11.2016). 
35 Yu. N. Fedorov, “Measures planned by the RF Government to promote reduction of greenhouse gas emissions”. 
Roshydromet, Round Table “Global climate problems: relevance for Russia”, 24 May 2017. 
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economically unjustified. This underscores the need for a more balanced economic 
development policy. Furthermore, ample gas reserves makes it possible for Russia to maintain 
a strong position in the gas market in Europe and Gazprom uses climate as an argument for 
gas. However, the development of gas demand depends on many factors, and there is no broad 
agreement on the role of gas in Europe's energy future. 
The task of partner governments 
Given the increasing pace of global decarbonisation, Russia needs carbon regulation and more 
robust national GHG targets now. In bilateral meetings, with BRICS, the SCO (Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation) and at other summits, the country’s main trading partners (China, 
Germany, Japan, Korea, India, the Nordic countries) should make it clear that today there is no 
doubt about the anthropogenic origins of climate change. This point has become especially 
important in view of the Trump administration’s 
climate scepticism, in line with Russian attitudes. It is 
essential to convince Moscow that global 
developments have been proceeding more rapidly 
than expected in Russian prognoses, and Russia’s GHG 
targets will need to be compatible with the goals of the 
Paris Agreement. 
The Chinese ‘Belt and Road’ initiative, with its emphasis on an environmentally responsible 
approach, could play a role here. For instance, Beijing has established environmental 
requirements for investments and low-carbon parameters for projects on Russian territory. 
This could help prove to Moscow that Beijing recognises the climate problem as being 
anthropogenic, and convincingly demonstrate that the global low-carbon trend is accelerating 
faster than expected. The Nordic countries, the Arctic science community, and Finland as the 
new chair of the Arctic Council, could inform authorities and businesses in the Arctic and 
Northwest Russia about climate facts and the ongoing economic changes that negatively affect 
the outlook for Arctic oil and gas. Nordic big business active in Russia, such as IKEA and Fortum, 
could also contribute by communicating these messages to their Russian partners. South Korea, 
the main buyer of Russian coal for energy generation, could discuss its U-turn from coal towards 
gas and renewables. Japan is in a position to underline that buying Russian coal is just a 
temporary measure, bridging nuclear and renewables. Germany, with its traditionally strong 
economic relations with Russia, could demonstrate its phase-out of coal and the shift from 
fossil fuels to renewables. 
The possibilities for other countries to exert influence on Russia’ climate positions may be less 
obvious. But routinely including climate issues on the agenda when main partner governments 
meet Russia could make a difference. Sending a consistent message across discussions could 
generate important pressure to follow the science-based international consensus. Russia did 
join the international chorus, at least in rhetoric, during the preparatory process prior to the 
Copenhagen climate summit, as demonstrated by the 2009 Climate Doctrine. Although the top-
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level Russian leadership seems to have back-tracked since then, bringing Russia nearer the 
international mainstream again should not be considered mission impossible. 
Conclusions 
Despite the latest information provided by leading Russian climate scientists, the country’s 
political leadership has backtracked from its 2009 recognition of the anthropogenic origins of 
climate change. Yet the Kremlin has since acknowledged the negative impacts of climate 
change. Noting the growing risks to Russian territory, it now emphasises the need for 
adaptation, contrary to its previous tendency to ignore or minimise the risks.  
Ignoring signals about the phase-out of coal and subsequently oil, the leadership still relies on 
Russian prognoses that the global fossil-fuel era will continue for the time being. The Paris 
Agreement is seen as part of a global economic trend that will generate risks for Russia’s 
economy, but only in the distant future. This view leads to delays in implementing robust 
measures on GHG emissions cuts. Carbon regulation is included as a policy tool for 
implementing new technologies, but is planned for economy-wide launch only in the 2030s. 
The short-term focus remains on energy-efficiency improvements, with the current GHG 
emissions target mainly reflecting a business-as-usual scenario. 
There is no doubt that Russia will comply with its 2030 INDC. However, this indicates neither a 
credible package of climate mitigation measures nor a high-tech, low-carbon economic 
development path. If GHG emissions remain above the current INDC (excluding LULUCF) in 
2030, it would send a very serious signal of Russia lagging behind global low-carbon 
developments and not being prepared for the post-fossil era. Failure to recognise the urgent 
need for action, including the direct impact of the climate factor, might plunge the country into 
deep crisis, because a global decrease in oil demand could cut Russian revenues while the costs 
entailed by extreme weather events would increase dramatically. If Russia fails to develop 
domestic renewable energy in time this gap could be both financial and technological.  
